INTRODUCTION
The discussion of vagueness and approximation in empirical and especially physical theories -as far as it is intended as a part of meta-science -faces the following problem. There are practically no utterances of practising scientists about the relation of theory and approximation which could serve as 'data' against which the meta-discussion might be 'tested'. This is not to say that approximation is not relevant for physics: the very first laboratory courses in physics prove the contrary. The calculation of errors in measurement and the 'theory of disturbances' are essential for physical methodology. But these achievements are not suited to clarify the relation between theories and reality.
Consequently the meta-discussion cannot proceed 'empirically', i.e. by formulating hypotheses for which 'real life' examples are presented. Rather the discussion is 'analytic' in the sense that it analyses the connection between theory and reality and the role of approximation on the basis of some general background. As long as we have no case studies of concrete examples of approximation the discussion will remain analytic, and what I shall have to say in the following will be analytic to a large extent, also.
There are at least three proposals for treating vagueness or approximation technically. A first, 'classical' text here is Przelecki's [9] . He offers an apparatus in terms of the semantics of first-or higher-order theories. A second proposal is due to Ludwig who introduces topological uniformities to 'smear over' the sharp theoretical images of the theory (see hin contribution in this volume, or his [7] ). Thirdly, Moulines in [8] has applied Ludwig's ideas to Sneed's theory concept.
